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Levelling the playing field?
Active labour market policies,
educational attainment
and unemployment
Luc Benda, Ferry Koster and Romke J. van der Veen
Department of Public Administration and Sociology,
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how active labour market policy (ALMP) training
programmes and hiring subsidies increase or decrease differences in the unemployment risk between lesser
and higher educated people during an economic downturn. A focus is put on potential job competition
dynamics and cumulative (dis)advantages of the lesser and higher educated.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses multi-level data. The fifth wave (2010) of the European
Social Survey was used and combined with macro-level data on labour market policies of the OECD.
The sample consisted of 18,172 observations in 19 countries.
Findings – The results show that higher levels of participation and spending on training policies are related
to a smaller difference in the unemployment risks of the educational groups. Higher training policy intensity
is associated with a lower unemployment risk for the lesser educated and a higher unemployment risk for the
higher educated. This implies that the lesser educated are better able to withstand downward pressure from
the higher educated, thereby, reducing downward displacement during an economic downturn.
Hiring subsidies do not seem to be associated with the impact of education on unemployment.
Originality/value – The paper adds to the discussion on ALMP training and hiring subsidies that are
primarily rooted in the human capital theory and signalling theory. Both theories ignore the social context of
labour market behaviour. The job competition theory and cumulative (dis)advantage theory add to these
theories by focussing on the relative position of individuals and the characteristics that accompany the social
position of the individual.
Keywords Unemployment, Displacement, Active labour market policy, Cumulative (dis)advantage,
Job competition, Matthew effect
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
This study aims to explain cross-national variation in the impact of education upon the
unemployment risk using an institutional theoretical perspective. Structural changes in the
economy weakened the position of the lesser educated, increasing their vulnerability to
economic downturns. Researchers argue that labour market opportunities and outcomes of
the lesser educated have diminished over recent decades as a result of the transformation of
the economy. Under the influence of technological innovation and economic globalisation,
the economy transforms from an industrial economy to a knowledge economy (Powell and
Snellman, 2004). Due to technological innovation, labour demand shifts from low-skilled
labour to high-skilled labour (Katz and Autor, 1999). However, it also seems that new
technologies also affect jobs in the middle of the job structure, such as when routine
production and clerical tasks are replaced (Autor et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007).
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Consequently, workers that used to work in the middle segment increasingly compete for
jobs with workers in the lower segment. Increased economic globalisation also weakens the
labour market position of the less educated due to a reallocation of low-skilled jobs to
developing countries (Wood, 1995). Demand for flexible labour also increased to efficiently
adjust organisations to market fluctuations caused by increased international competition
(McCann et al., 2008). As the likelihood of lesser educated people of having a flexible
employment contract is higher (Schmid, 2010), economic globalisation is not only associated
with a decrease in local demand for low-skilled jobs, but also with a reduced level of job
security for the lesser educated.
The weaker labour market position of the lesser educated makes them more vulnerable
to the consequences of economic shocks. During the Great Recession of 2008, lesser
educated workers were indeed more susceptible to the economic shocks than the higher
educated (Verick and Islam, 2010; Vuolo et al., 2016). Having a higher probability of working
in sectors most affected by the economic shock (e.g. the construction sector) and having
lower job security, partly explains this (Verick and Islam, 2010). Additionally, during
economic downturns, the likelihood of the more educated displacing the lesser educated
increases, i.e. people with high or middle education who cannot find a job lower their
reservation wage and accept jobs under their educational level. Employers tend to raise their
educational requirements when economic circumstances worsen. This causes the highly
educated to displace the middle educated and so on. Hence, the probability of being pushed
out of the labour market increases more for the lowest educated (Klein, 2015). Studies show,
however, that the impact of a crisis differs between countries (OECD, 2010; Verick and
Islam, 2010) and that changes in the impact of education upon employment probabilities
also differ between countries (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010). Hence, national characteristics
mediate the severity of education-related risks during an economic downturn. Explanatory
factors for variations in risk distributions between countries, besides the structural changes,
include institutional factors such as labour market policies (Bennett, 2016) as well as the
specific social and cognitive composition of the low educated in a given country
(Gesthuizen et al., 2011; Abrassart, 2013).
Against this background, active labour market policies (ALMPs) are of special interest.
These policies intend to improve the labour market position of disadvantaged social
groups (Martin and Grubb, 2001). ALMPs try to reduce unemployment by improving the
quality of the supply side through upskilling and by reducing hiring risks associated with
disadvantaged social groups on the demand side. Both strategies are rooted in the human
capital theory and signalling theory. Based on the human capital theory, unemployment is
understood to be the product of possessing unmarketable skills (Becker, 1962). Thus,
learning skills demanded by employers is necessary in order to improve one’s labour
market position. Furthermore, hiring decisions are associated with high risks for
employers due to information asymmetry regarding the productive potential of
applicants. According to signalling theory, employers rely on crude signals as
screening devices to reduce the risk of making a costly hiring mistake (Stiglitz, 1975).
The educational level of the applicant is one such signal (Arrow, 1973). Along with stating
the knowledge and skills of the applicant, educational attainment also signals a level of
readiness and an ability to acquire new job-specific knowledge and skills. The latter point
is a key, according to Spence (1973), since most relevant skills and specialised knowledge
are most likely acquired on the job. Therefore, ALMP programmes that improve the signal
of their unemployed participants and reduce their perceived training costs should result in
improved labour market opportunities.
However, the empirical results on the market opportunities (increasing options for
high-quality jobs and re-employment of unemployed) are mixed (Brown and Koettl, 2015).
While the human capital theory and signalling theory lead to compelling insights for
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critically evaluating ALMPs, neither seems able to account for variations in the observed
effects of ALMPs. To better understand the effects of ALMPs, it is important to first
differentiate between various ALMP instruments, as their effects differ (Sianesi, 2008).
ALMP measures directly linked to improving human capital and reducing information
asymmetry include training programmes and hiring subsidies. Training programmes aim at
improving the human capital of participants by teaching them skills that are currently in
need. In the case of workplace training, a training programme also reduces information
asymmetry by providing an opportunity for the employer to acquire information on the
participant (Carling and Richardson, 2004). Hiring subsidies are financial incentives that are
specifically targeted at hiring the unemployed. Although hiring subsidies resemble wage
subsidies, they are different because they are usually of short term, while wage subsidies
can last as long as that person remains employed. Furthermore, hiring subsidies are mainly
aimed at disadvantaged unemployed, while wage subsidies also cover the employed (Brown
and Koettl, 2015). However, in both cases, effects are also observed that undermine the
original policy goals. For example, participation in ALMP programmes might also lengthen
the unemployment duration, which further hurts a person’s chance at employment
(van Ours, 2004), displace other workers from their jobs (Calmfors et al., 2001) or be used by
social groups that are not the intended target social group (Kocór and Worek, 2017). Any
one of these processes can have the net effect of increasing inequality, so more insight into
the effects of ALMPs are needed for policy makers to make informed investment decisions.
To investigate the effects of training programmes and hiring subsidies on the variation
in the unemployment risk depending on education, the job competition theory and
cumulative (dis)advantage theory are used. Neither theory denies the central ideas posited in
human capital theory and signalling theory but each provides additional insights. In order
to investigate the theoretical expectations following from both theories, a comparative
dataset was constructed that links national-level ALMPs to the unemployment risk on the
individual level. We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) of 2010 as it contains
data that are collected during the economic crisis and combined the ESS data set with
macro-level indicators from the OECD.
This papwe is structured as follows. In the next section, the possible outcomes that
training programmes and hiring subsidies might produce are theorised using the job
competition theory and cumulative (dis)advantage theory. Then, the data and methods used
to empirically test the hypotheses are described. In the following section, the results of my
analysis are presented. The paper ends with a discussion and conclusion based on the
obtained results.
Job competition and substitution
According to the job competition theory, as explained by Thurow (1975), one’s labour market
opportunities are always relative to those of others. Employers rank applicants based on the
costs they need to reach the full productive potential of a given job, forming a labour queue.
This labour queue is matched with the job queue, which is the ordering of available jobs
ordered according to their training requirements and rewards. The jobs with the highest
training requirements are matched with persons with the lowest training costs until all job
openings are filled. Hence, job competition is based on the ability to signal the lowest possible
training costs to the employer relative to other applicants. Because the position in the labour
queue is always relative, the probability of acquiring a job depends on the strength of the
signal compared to that of others . In this context, the level of education is used as a signal for
cognitive and non-cognitive skills of the applicant (Parsons, 1959). Non-cognitive skills refer to
habits and traits, such as discipline, politeness and attendance, while cognitive skills refer to
abilities related to reading, writing and mathematics among others (Farkas, 2003). Research
shows that especially in the interactive service economy non-cognitive skills are more highly
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valued by employers than cognitive skills. However, non-cognitive skills are an additional
requirement to cognitive skills, not a substitution (Mýtna Kureková et al., 2016). The options to
measure both skill groups during the hiring process differ. Whereas cognitive skills can be
more easily measured with standardized tests, non-cognitive skills are harder to measure,
which induces the use of subjective criteria (Kmec, 2006). This suggests that when it comes
to non-cognitive skills, employers rely more on presumed (stereotypical) group characteristics
to order their applicants during the screening process instead of their actual skill level.
Following the logic of the job competition theory, the labour queue position of the lesser
educated can be improved by ALMPs that reduce training costs and provide opportunities for
employers to obtain information on the actual skills and skill levels. However, at the same
time, the higher educated would then obtain a lower position in the labour queue, lowering
their chances of obtaining a job. As a result, downward substitution should happen to a lesser
extent in labour markets that make more use of ALMPs.
Following the theoretical logic of the job competition theory, it is expected that both
training programmes and hiring subsidies affect the unemployment risk by influencing the
expected training costs and availability of information on the actual skill level of an
applicant. Because training programmes are primarily aimed at skill development through
general, vocational or firm-specific education (Brunetti and Corsini, 2017), the perceived
training costs for employers should be lower. Additionally, educational activities also
socialise people for work (Bowles and Gintis, 2000, 2002). Conversely, being outside of the
educational system and the labour market implies that a work-related de-socialisation takes
place. These signals represent not only higher training costs to employers, but also a lack or
loss of attractive behavioural traits. Through participating in training programmes, the
lesser educated may correct this and signal lower training costs to the employer based on
the possession of desired skills and behavioural traits. Furthermore, it might be expected
that participation in ALMP training activities signals a readiness to learn; however, it is also
argued that participation in ALMP programmes might stigmatise participants. Research
(Bonoli and Hinrichs, 2012) shows that participation in labour market programmes is
viewed as a positive signal by employers or is seen as at least better than inactivity during a
period of unemployment. The signalling effect of ALMP programme participation tends to
differ depending on the distance one has to the labour market. Whereas participation is
viewed as a positive signal for those with a weak position, it may have no effect or even a
negative effect on stronger participants (Liechti et al., 2017). This suggests that training
programme participation mainly benefits the people with less education in terms of
improving one’s position in the labour queue. Furthermore, when training programmes take
place in the workplace, instead of a classroom, these programmes can be used by employers
as screening devices to obtain more information on the actual skill level of participants
(Brunetti and Corsini, 2017). This potentially reduces the negative consequences associated
with assumed stereotypical group characteristics. As these types of programmes are
primarily aimed at the lesser educated, they offer them an advantage over the higher
educated regarding information asymmetry. Hence, we hypothesise that:
H1. During an economic downturn, the lesser educated have a lower unemployment risk
in labour markets with high training programme intensity compared to the lesser
educated in a labour market with low training programme intensity, and vice versa
for the higher educated.
Hiring subsidies also have the potential to influence labour queue dynamics. In those
programmes, the labour costs of participants are (partially) covered through financial
measures for a fixed period. Thus, building on the job competition theoretical logic, the
training costs to a potential employer are lower and therefore the position in the labour
queue of those who are eligible is higher. Consequently, those who are not eligible are
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pushed to a lower position in the labour queue, reducing their employment opportunities.
Furthermore, when participants are employed during a subsidy period, the employer is able
to obtain information on the productive potential of the subsidised worker (Brown and
Koettl, 2015). Employers may be more willing to retain lesser-educated participants as it
potentially reduces negative biases towards these types of workers. Besides reducing
information asymmetry, participants also obtain firm-specific human capital (Sianesi, 2008),
which reduces training costs substantially. However, it also argued that hiring subsidies
have the potential to displace employed workers. Two effects can be hypothesised relating
to job competition. First, employed workers are fired and replaced by subsidised workers.
Second, in order for employers to become eligible for a hiring subsidy, the educational
requirements are lowered and workers are replaced with subsidised workers who are lesser
educated (Brown and Koettl, 2015). If these substitution effects would occur, it is more
probable that the middle and highly educated are affected in a negative sense. Both
educational groups have a higher chance of being employed during an economic downturn
than the less educated (Klein, 2015). This implies that:
H2. During an economic downturn the lesser educated in a labour market with a higher
hiring subsidy intensity have a lower risk of becoming unemployed than the lesser
educated in labour markets with a lower hiring subsidy intensity, and vice versa for
the higher educated during an economic downturn.
Cumulative (dis)advantage and the Matthew effect
The possibility also exists that ALMPs increase labour market inequalities between lesser
and higher educated people. ALMPs might produce a Matthew effect due to cumulative
advantages of higher educated people and cumulative disadvantages of the lesser educated.
The central idea of such an effect is that a group-based advantage or disadvantage will
grow over time, widening inequality between social groups. Small disadvantages at a
certain point in time might prevent closing the inequality gap or make it more difficult to do
so. Conversely, small advantages at a certain time point might provide the opportunity to
widen the gap even further between groups (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006). In short, cumulative
(dis)advantage is a micro-level process that produces a macro-level effect of increasing
inequality, i.e. a Matthew effect (Bask and Bask, 2015).
In the process of maximising the output of ALMP programmes during an economic
recession, higher educated job seekers might be more favourable than lesser educated
candidates. The practice of placing the unemployed with the highest re-employment
probability in ALMP programmes instead of those who need it the most is called “creaming”
(Brown and Koettl, 2015). It is logical to assume that creaming is more likely to happen
during an economic downturn because it increases the probability of budget cuts and to the
existence of vacancies that are harder to fill. Even during an economic downturn, the
possibility still exists that employers have vacancies that are hard to fill, even though labour
supply is relatively high (Erken et al., 2015). If ALMP measures such as training
programmes and hiring subsidies are used to reduce mismatching, it is expected that the
more educated have a higher probability to obtain employment compared to the lesser
educated. Furthermore, not all occupations have the same level of accessibility. Institutions
can be used to “artificially” reduce supply for certain occupational groups. In this way,
members of those occupational groups are better protected from competition and their
position is strengthened. Access to certain occupations can be limited through things like
licensing, credentialing and certifying (Weeden, 2002). As people with higher education have
generally enjoyed more education, it is expected that the training costs of higher educated
people to obtain the desired skills or to get access to the job are lower than those of the lesser
educated if they compete for the same job. Thus, this suggests that fewer activation
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measures or measures enacted at a lesser intensity would be needed for higher educated
people to become eligible for the same vacancy compared to lesser educated people.
The higher educated are also more positively predisposed to training and learning
activities than the lesser educated. The lesser educated often refer to negative experiences
during their educational career as reasons for their not participating in training programmes
(Illeris, 2006). Additionally, research shows that a lower willingness to train by the less
educated is driven by differing economic preferences and personality traits on average
compared to the higher educated, such as the preference for leisure, openness to experience
or one’s internal locus of control (Fouarge et al., 2013). When people who have a lower
willingness to train are forced to participate in a training programme, they often develop
coping strategies that hinder the formation of human capital. These strategies involve
things like focussing only on what might be personally useful, getting through by making
things as easy as possible (instrumentalism) and becoming passive aggressive (Illeris, 2003).
All of this suggests that processes of cumulative advantage and disadvantage increase
inequality in labour markets with higher levels of training programme intensity. Due to
having higher amounts of human capital and lower costs to successfully reintegrate into the
labour market, higher educated people are more likely to utilise training programmes
successfully. Lesser educated people, on the other hand, are on average more negatively
predisposed to training, which hinders their participation and hinders them from
successfully obtaining marketable skills. Hence, we expect that:
H3. During an economic downturn the difference in the unemployment risk between the
low and the higher educated is greater in labour markets with a high training
programme intensity than in labour markets with a low training programme
intensity during an economic downturn.
Related to hiring subsidies, stigmatisation is a frequently mentioned cumulative process of
disadvantage. It is argued that when hiring subsidies are too narrowly targeted, eligibility
signals low productivity. This signal reduces hiring probability and thus increases the
unemployment duration (Brown and Koettl, 2015). Because long unemployment spells are
also perceived as signals for low productivity (Bonoli and Hinrichs, 2012), hiring subsidies
might further weaken the position of the lesser educated who are more likely to become
eligible for a hiring subsidy. However, during an economic downturn, the negative
signalling function of unemployment and activation programme eligibility should be much
weaker. When unemployment is high, individual unemployment is perceived as more
normal and, therefore, does not necessarily imply a low quality of worker (Lupi and Ordine,
2002). This implies that stigmatisation based on hiring subsidy eligibility is less likely to
happen during an economic downturn. However, if unemployment is widespread, the
probability for the higher educated to become eligible for hiring subsidies also increases,
especially when eligibility criteria are based primarily on unemployment duration.
A potential consequence here is that employers would use hiring subsidies to hire workers
who are higher educated. Thus, if hiring subsidies produce a Matthew effect, it is more likely
to be a cumulative advantage for the higher educated. As a result, we expect that:
H4. During an economic downturn the difference in the unemployment risk between the
low and higher educated is greater in labour markets with a high spending level on
hiring subsidies than in labour markets with a low spending level during an
economic downturn.
Data and method
To answer the research question, we used the fifth wave of the ESS (2010). The ESS contains
micro-level data on 27 countries and includes a total of 52,458 observations. As we are
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interested in the labour market population, data on individuals younger than 15 and older
than 65 are excluded. The micro-level data of the ESS are combined with macro-level data on
ALMPs from the OECD because it is expected that the institutional structure of a national
labour market partly influences the unemployment risk on the micro-level. The combination
of micro-level and macro-level into one dataset allows us to simultaneously model the
contextual and individual level variables, which prevents misleading conclusions to be
drawn based on aggregated (ecological fallacy) or disaggregated data (atomistic fallacy).
A disadvantage of multilevel data is that within-group errors tend to correlate due to
common history, which results in standard errors that are too small (Hox, 2010). Several
statistical techniques were used to address statistical issues concerning multilevel data.
After excluding observations that did not meet the selection criterion and because not all
countries in the ESS data set are covered by the OECD concerning specific ALMPs, the
analyses were performed on data from 19 countries and 18,172 observations.
Micro-level variables
To measure labour market status, respondents were asked to indicate the activities that
they had been doing over the last seven days. If they marked more than one activity, they
were asked to mark the activity that best describes their situation. The options included in
the analysis were paid work, unemployed and looking for a job, and unemployed and not
looking for a job. All other options were excluded from the analyses. Because ALMPs
primarily aim to transition both the unemployed who are looking and not looking for work
into employment and aim to prevent the employed from transitioning into unemployment,
the analyses mainly focus on the difference between employment and unemployment in
general. Both unemployment categories were therefore combined to form one
unemployment indicator.
Although the theoretical section implies a certain dichotomy, a continuous variable
was used because both groups refer to the tails of the educational distribution and
theoretical reasoning is linear. Furthermore, a categorical variable would also increase
measurement error by grouping people in relatively broad categories. Therefore, the
educational level was measured using the International Standard Level of Education
(ISLED) scale. The educational classifications from the International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED) are scaled using a cause-and-effect scaling
technique and projected on a 0–100 metric using the length of educational career (in
years) as a calibration measure. Measurement quality of ISLED outperforms both
duration and ISCED as education measures (for a detailed description and testing of
ISLED, see Schröder, 2014; Schröder and Ganzeboom, 2014). Because this variable is used
in an interaction, it is mean centred.
Due to educational expansion during the last decades, the number of highly educated
increased, and consequently, in many European countries highly educated people tend to be
younger on average. Hence, age is controlled for and measured in years. On average, people
belonging to ethnic minorities also tend to have lower educational credentials and a higher
risk of being unemployed. A dummy variable was included to measure if the respondent
belongs to an ethnic minority within the country the person lives in. Gender was included as
a dummy variable referring to female respondents. A categorical variable measuring trade
union membership was also included in the analyses. Trade union membership is negatively
related to the educational level and also potentially negatively related to unemployment due
to increased labour market protection. Additionally, it is expected that trade union members
have more information on ALMPs than non-members due to the information function that
the trade union fulfils for its members. This might increase participation in ALMPs among
trade union members. The variable consists of three categories, namely: “yes, currently”,
“yes, previously” and “no”.
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Macro-level variables
The theoretical expectation is that training programmes and hiring subsidies moderate the
relationship between education and unemployment. The common practice is to measure
ALMP intensity on the national level as a percentage of GDP. However, the OECD also
provides an option that operationalises ALMP intensity as the number of participants as the
percentage of the total labour force. Both measures are used to check the sensitivity of
the observed patterns. A distinction is also made between classroom training and workplace
training because the theory suggests that the effects might differ between both forms.
A training programme where participants spend 75 per cent or more of the training time in
an educational institution is considered to be classroom training. The OECD also provides
indicators for training programmes where 50 per cent or where 75 per cent or more of
training time is spent in the workplace, both of which are considered to be workplace
training. Workplace training also includes apprenticeship programmes that consist of
incentives to recruit apprentices or training allowances for disadvantaged groups.
Apprenticeships that follow from participation in the regular educational system are not
included. Because the intended effects of training programmes generally become manifest in
the longer term (Strandh and Nordlund, 2008), e.g. within one to three years (Lechner et al.,
2007), we lagged training variables by two years and use measurements from 2008.
Moreover, hiring subsidies consist of measures that promote the creation or take-up of new
jobs or that promote the improvement of employability through work experience and are
paid only for a limited period of time. As hiring subsidies have an immediate effect when
they are utilised (Strandh and Nordlund, 2008), measurements originate from 2010. Because
these variables are used in an interaction, they are mean centred (Table I).
Method
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, binary logistic regression is the appropriate
analytical method for the analyses. Because the data are clustered (people are clustered in
countries), the independence of observations assumption is violated. If the clustering is not
N Mean SD Min. Max.
Micro-data
Unemployment 18,172 0.130 0 1
Education (ISLED) 18,172 50.989 19.694 17.530 91.530
Ethnic minority 18,172 0.055 0 1
Female 18,172 0.519 0 1
Age 18,172 41.581 11.540 16 64
Trade union membership
Yes, currently 18,172 0.261 0 1
Yes, previously 18,172 0.136 0 1
No 18,172 0.603 0 1
Macro-data
ALMP training (participation) 19 0.981 0.750 0.040 2.240
ALMP training (spending) 19 0.144 0.112 0.010 0.350
ALMP classroom training (participation) 19 0.632 0.551 0.040 1.970
ALMP classroom training (spending) 19 0.098 0.093 0.010 0.320
ALMP workplace training (participation) 19 0.335 0.380 0.000 1.310
ALMP workplace training (spending) 19 0.038 0.037 0.000 0.100
Hiring subsidy (participation) 19 1.287 1.064 0.070 4.530
Hiring subsidy (spending) 19 0.124 0.113 0.020 0.500
Sources: ESS 2010 (micro-data) and OECD (macro-data), own elaboration
Table I.
Descriptives
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accounted for, unreliable estimates are obtained. To correct for this data structure,
multilevel analysis is commonly used. Multilevel analysis corrects clustered data by
including random effects, which capture the variation between clusters. Fixed effects are
also estimated, which are the general relationships between the dependent and independent
variables regardless of cluster membership (Hox, 2010).
However, these models are criticised in light of cross-national research. First, the samples
of countries used are considered small (less than 25). The low number of countries affects
coefficient estimation procedures, resulting in standard errors that are too narrow. As a result,
the p-values are too small (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; McNeish, 2016). When using multilevel
logistic regression, Bryan and Jenkins (2016) recommend at least 30 countries as the absolute
minimum in order to obtain consistent estimates. Hence, the use of multilevel models is less
than optimal. However, McNeish (2016) shows in a simulation study that using penalized
quasi-likelihood with a Kenward–Roger correction produces trustworthy results. The
Kenward–Roger correction is a post-estimation technique that inflates standard errors and
adjusts degrees of freedom based on variability within the variable. This produces p-values
that are more conservative (McNeish, 2017). As SAS is the only statistical programme that
offers the Kenward–Roger correction in combination with multilevel logistic analysis, we used
the glimmix procedure with the Newton–Raphson with the Ridging optimizer.
Second, because relatively few countries are available in comparative data sets, few
control variables on the country level can be included in the model. Hence, multilevel
analysis in cross-national research is prone to omitted variable bias (Möhring, 2012).
An alternative to multilevel analysis is fixed effect models (FEMs) (Huang, 2016). In FEMs,
for comparative cross-sectional analysis, N−1 country dummies are included to control for
all country-level heterogeneity. Omitted variable bias on the country level is ruled out, and
thus, time-specific cyclical components of unemployment as well as the structural
components of unemployment are controlled for. However, this also means that main
country effects on individual outcomes cannot be estimated (Möhring, 2012). Nevertheless,
cross-level interactions can still be included into FEMs because these coefficients also vary
on the individual level (Allison, 2009; McNeish and Stapleton, 2016). FEMs were estimated
that included interactions between ALMP indicators and the education indicator.
Because the main effect of the ALMP variables cannot be included with FEM, the
interpretation of the interaction coefficient is more difficult. Therefore, we use the FEM
mainly to check the robustness of the interaction coefficients of the multilevel models.
Third, the selection of countries is not random. Thus, influential cases on the country
level can have strong effects on the estimates. To investigate the effects of influential cases
in the context of ML, Bowers and Drake (2005) advise the use of visualisation techniques to
provide additional information on the micro-level relationships within macro-level
units. Hence, the within-country effects are estimated while being controlled for the
before-mentioned micro-level characteristics and plotted against a country characteristic to
visually inspect if the estimates become more positive or more negative when the
characteristic specific ALMP programme intensity increases.
To address the methodological issues of cross-national research, we use multilevel
analysis, FEMs and the visual procedure side by side to evaluate the relationships found.
The multilevel coefficients are used to predict the average labour market status probability
if all the analyses indicate that there is a significant and robust interaction. The predicted
probabilities are then plotted to ease the interpretation of the interactions.
Results
The results for ALMP training programmes (H1 and H3) are first discussed, which is
followed by a discussion on the results for hiring subsidies (H2 and H4). The results of the
multilevel logistic regression using participation rates as indicators for ALMP intensity are
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presented in Table II. The results with the indicators based on spending as a percentage of
GDP are presented in Table AI. To test the hypotheses that the difference in the impact of
education upon unemployment is smaller (H1) or bigger (H3) in labour markets with a high
intensity of ALMP training compared with labour markets with a low intensity, interaction
terms were estimated using both training programme indicators and the indicator for
educational attainment. The first model in Table II shows a significant positive interaction
between overall training participation and education on being unemployed (b¼ 0.011,
po0.05). A similar pattern is observed in Table AI concerning overall training participation
(b¼ 0.071, po0.05). The FEMs confirm these observations (see Table AII). The plots of
within-country estimates of education on unemployment and spending on and participation
in overall training both show a general positive relationship (see Figure A1). This suggests
that the obtained results are robust against outliers and omitted variable bias on the country
level. Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of the interaction between ALMP training
participation, based on the multilevel model, that the predicted unemployment risk for the
lesser educated is on average lower in countries with a higher participation rate, whereas the
unemployment risk is on average higher for people with a higher education compared to a
country with a low participation rate. The same pattern is observed concerning training
programme spending.
Furthermore, a distinction was also made between ALMP classroom training and ALMP
workplace training. Both ALMP classroom training spending and participation positively
moderate the relation between education and unemployment (b¼ 0.076, po0.05
and b¼ 0.012, po0.05). The results of the FEM (see Table AII) and the plot of the
within-country estimates of education on unemployment (see Figure A2) indicate that this
finding is robust against outliers or omitted variable bias on the country level. Figure 2
shows that, just like in the case of overall spending on ALMP training, lesser educated
people in countries with high participation levels on ALMP classroom training have on
average a lower unemployment risk compared to lesser educated people in countries with
low spending levels. The opposite holds for people who are highly educated. Tables II and
AI also show that the interaction between ALMP workplace training participation and
spending does not moderate the relation between education and unemployment. To
conclude, the findings support H1 in the case of overall ALMP training and ALMP
classroom training, while H3 is rejected. In the case of ALMP workplace training, both H1
and H3 are rejected.
To test the hypotheses that the impact of education on unemployment is smaller (H2) or
bigger (H4) in labour markets with a high intensity of hiring subsidies compared with
labour markets with a low intensity. Tables II and AI show that all the estimates for the
interaction effects including hiring subsidies are not significantly different from zero. The
FEM shows similar results (see Table AII). After a visual inspection of the within-country
coefficients, the same conclusion is reached in line with the numerical analyses. As a result,
we conclude that hiring subsidy intensity is not related to the impact of education on
unemployment and both H2 and H4 are rejected.
Conclusion and discussion
The study utilises the job competition theory and cumulative (dis)advantage theory, as a
contrast to the human capital and signalling theory, to formulate hypotheses about the
potential effects that both ALMP programmes have on the impact of education on
the unemployment risk. This study finds that hiring subsidy intensity is not associated with
the relation between education and unemployment during an economic downturn.
Nonetheless, training programmes do seem to affect the impact education has upon
unemployment. Besides studying training programme spending and participation in
general, a distinction was made between classroom training and workplace training.
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Higher levels of overall ALMP training programme intensity seem to be related to an
improved labour market position of lesser educated people and a weaker labour market
position of people who are highly educated. The results support job competition theory,
which states that the strength of labour market signals is always relative to those of others.
Thus, when the employment probability of one increases through a strengthening of the
labour signal as the result of human capital development, those of others decrease. This
implies that downward substitution is reduced, and the unemployment risk is distributed
more evenly across educational groups. The higher educated are less likely to obtain a job
with lower qualification requirements because of the stronger position of the lesser
educated. Other researchers present similar findings. For instance, Bennett (2016) shows
that with stricter employment protection legislation the less educated have a lower
probability of becoming unemployed, while, at the same time, stricter EPL is associated with
a higher unemployment risk for the highly educated.
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Furthermore, no support was found that cumulative advantages associated with the
higher educated decreased their unemployment risk further or that cumulative
disadvantages of the lesser educated increased their unemployment risk. Micro-level
processes such as creaming practices, the more positive predisposition to learning by the
higher educated, the negative effects of mandatory participation or the increased probability
of activation programme eligibility by the higher educated do not seem to result in a
Matthew effect on the macro-level. However, as this study only investigates training
programmes and hiring subsidies, it might be possible that other programmes induce a
Matthew effect. Nonetheless, the results indicate that human capital theory is somewhat
limited in its explanatory power concerning the relation between education and
unemployment. Although its core premise that upskilling leads to a stronger labour
market position seems to hold, this mechanism operates in a social context and therefore
affects others also.
Policy makers should be aware that non-participants can also be affected by policy
interventions and improving the labour market position of one group might deteriorate to
position of another group. Thus, training programmes can be used to strengthen the
position of people with less education during an economic downturn but, at the same time,
these programmes seem to increase unemployment among people with higher education.
This might be somewhat problematic in labour markets that focus more heavily on
knowledge production due to negative consequences of unemployment, such as skill
deterioration. This might hamper economic productivity due to reduced labour supply when
the economy starts to recover.
This study is not without limitations. Implicit assumptions were made in the theoretical
section that the unemployed individuals with varying educational backgrounds actually use
the ALMP programmes available to them. However, data on individual utilisation of ALMP
programmes are not included in the analytical framework. Thus, we do not know how higher
ALMP intensity on the national level influences the use of ALMP programmes on the
individual level. Future research should focus on how the configuration of the ALMPs might
affect the way ALMP programmes are used by the lesser and higher educated. Furthermore,
the indicators used to provide a measurement of ALMP intensity on the national level are very
broad. We only know there is a difference in intensity, but we do not know how these
measures are implemented. This loss of detail might affect the analysis. Research shows that
ALMP resources are not always translated into high-quality services (Sztandar-Sztanderska,
2009) and the user–officer relation can influence the outcomes (Coletto and Simona, 2018).
Biased estimates could be obtained due to the use of broad measures. Furthermore, causal
claims cannot be made. As institutional configurations are strongly correlated over time,
lagging the variables does not completely eliminate causality problems. Policies and
socio-economic patterns are bi-causally related as policies might affect employment outcomes
but, for instance, high unemployment rates might provoke a political demand to change the
ALMP policy mix. Future research should focus on distilling the causal effects of ALMPs
by using, for instance, instrumental variables or panel data. Although this study has
limitations, we feel that useful and interesting results are obtained that contribute to
discussions on the socio-economic consequences of educational attainment and the efficacy of
ALMP programmes.
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